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1 Introduction
Expectations play a central role in modern economics. The question of how to model expectations rev-
olutionized macroeconomics in the 1970s and has, of course, been the subject of several Nobel Prizes.
Expectations now play a key role in our understanding of business cycles and the design of policy in-
stitutions. The beliefs of firms are particularly important: Firms’ expectations about prices and costs
may affect their current pricing decisions and influence aggregate inflation dynamics. Different expecta-
tions about economic activity may lead to different outcomes today. And, by influencing these beliefs,
monetary policy-makers may be able to affect the economy, an aspect of the monetary transmission
mechanism that has featured heavily in the recent policy debate around the zero lower bound and the
use of forward guidance policies (see, e.g., Woodford (2012)).
But, despite decades of theoretical emphasis on expectations in macroeconomics, there is still rela-
tively little empirical evidence about what influences firms’ expectations or whether these matter in
reality. This is particularly important in light of the growing theoretical literature which deviates from
traditional assumptions of representative agents, complete information and rational expectations in
macroeconomics.1 This empirical gap, in part, stems from data limitations. Ideally expectations need
to be measured and although there is a range of well-used datasets that contain information on house-
hold and financial market expectations, data — and therefore empirical evidence — on the firm-side are
much more scarce. We fill this gap using a data set on firms’ expectations in manufacturing from the
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) in the United Kingdom. Using this dataset, our contribution
is to document a range of stylized facts about the degree of heterogeneity in firms’ expectations about a
range of price, cost and activity measures, the factors most correlated with these expectations, whether
these matter for current outcomes and whether these expectations are rational. We thus provide a body
of evidence to help inform economic theory.
To understand how firms’ expectations line up with the common theoretical assumptions, we structure
our analysis around three key issues: information, forward-looking behaviour and rationality. First we
ask: How homogeneous are firms’ beliefs and what factors can explain the variation in expectations
across firms and across time? We show that there is considerable dispersion in beliefs across firms in the
UK. Furthermore, there are important differences in the extent to which past outcomes are associated
with price, wage, activity and cost expectations. We show that firm-specific influences are important
for price and wage growth expectations. Aggregate factors also seem to matter for wage growth and,
1A growing literature considers non-rational expectations in macroeconomics, for example Garca-Schmidt and Wood-
ford (2015), Gabaix (2016), Farhi and Werning (2017). Deviations from complete information include Nimark (2008) who
introduces private information into firms’ pricing decisions and shows how this affect aggregate inflation dynamics and
Angeletos and Lian (2018) who study forward guidance policies under incomplete information.
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to a lesser extent, price growth expectations. Expectations of new orders and employment are more
associated with firm-specific activity measures, but cost expectations are correlated with both firm-
specific cost pressure and aggregate import price growth. Given the relatively limited existing work
on what determines expectations, the precise regression specification for exploring the determinants of
price, wage and cost expectations is unclear. In our attempt to uncover firms’ inflation expectation
function, we therefore also use Bayesian Model Averaging to explore 16,384 models, and find that
the aforementioned results are robust to model specification. Overall, our analysis therefore suggests
important heterogeneity in the attention paid to different indicators when forming expectations about
specific variables.
Secondly, we explore whether firms’ expectations matter for current pricing decisions. This mechanism
is at the heart of many forward-looking macro models; for example the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
relates current price inflation to expected future price changes and real marginal cost. The micro-
foundations of this type of Phillips Curve can be derived from several firm-price setting problems (e.g.
see Roberts (1995)) and, as illustrated in the Appendix, the Rotemberg (1982) formulation delivers a
pricing equation where firms’ current prices are set with reference to their expectations of their own
future price increases. Although our data do not allow us to estimate a Phillips Curve directly, due
to lack of firm-specific marginal cost data, our firm level panel data on firms’ own prices and their
expectations of their own future price movements allow to test whether firm’s expectations matter
for their pricing decisions. We use linear regressions and Bayesian Model Averaging to show that price
expectations are an important determinant of actual price setting in 99 percent of the more than 131,072
regression specification we explored.
Thirdly, we explore whether firms’ expectations are rational — a central tenet of many macroeconomic
models in recent decades. We show that the null hypothesis of rationality is rejected for most, if not all,
of the expectations variables. Taken together, these results cast doubt on a range of the informational
and behavioural assumptions typically made in macroeconomics. Our evidence therefore provides a
range of motivating evidence for future theoretical developments.
Several novel features of the CBI’s survey facilitate our analysis. In particular, the panel structure and
the rich set of expectation and out-turn variables make the survey ideal for our purposes. These data
contain expectations and outcomes for price growth, wage growth, new orders, employment and costs.
A valuable and distinctive feature of the data described here is that the CBI survey describes firms’
expectations of their own future circumstances and allows us to relate these to their reports of past
out-turns. This allows us to explore what factors seems to matter for firms’ expectations of their own
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trading situation, while controlling for a range of other influences. As far as we are aware, we are the
first to examine the role of firms’ expectations of their own outcomes.2 We are also able to exploit the
dynamics in the data, for example, by examining whether past realizations affect expectations today
and whether expectations about the future matter for current pricing decisions. Our panel approach
allows us to use a range of fixed-effects and firm level controls to deal with possible confounding effects.
As noted above, the way in which expectations are formed has recently attracted much attention and we
therefore contribute to this growing empirical literature. On the household side, for example, Armantier
et al. (2015) conduct an experiment to shed light on how inflation expectations affect decisions made
by consumers. They document that expectations about the future affect decisions today but there is
a significant amount of heterogeneity. Ichiue and Nishiguchi (2013) show that during the zero lower
bound episode in Japan, households that expected higher inflation in the future reported that their
household had increased consumption compared with one year ago but intended to decrease it in the
future. Bachmann et al. (2015) conduct a similar study using US data but do not find any significant
relationship between inflation expectations and consumer spending.
Turning to work on firms, the closest paper to our work is probably Coibion et al. (2018) who collect new
survey data on firms’ inflation expectations for New Zealand. Their paper provides evidence against
full information and rationality of firms’ inflation expectations, including evidence of dispersion which
seems to be related to inattention about recent macroeconomic conditions.3 By providing some firms
with information about the aggregate inflation target, the paper also shows that the associated change
in beliefs did not seem materially to affect prices and wages at the firm level, but did have an effect on
employment and investment. Our focus is on firm-level expectations about their own variables and we
the relationship between expectations and outcomes.
Also for New Zealand, Kumar et al. (2015) document the lack of anchoring of firms’ inflation expecta-
tions around the inflation target and show that firms’ expectations are quite dispersed. Afrouzi (2017)
develops a model of oligopolistic competition and strategic inattention and shows that this can ac-
count for several facts about firms’ expectations in New Zealand, including the dispersion in inflation
expectations and the disagreement between industry and aggregate level expectations. Coibion and
Gorodnichenko (2015) document that survey expectations of professional forecasters, firms, households
and FOMC members are heterogeneous and react sluggishly to news, in keeping with the predictions
2Other recent work, which we discuss below, on firms’ expectations have focused on expectations of macroeconomic
aggregates such as inflation, e.g. Coibion et al. (2018), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) and Kumar et al. (2015) which
we discuss below.
3 They also provide evidence that inattention can be explained by firms’ incentive to track different macroeconomic
indicators, consistent with rational inattention models where firms pay particular attention to news in variables that
matter the most.
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from noisy information models. Bryan et al. (2014) use the FRB Atlanta’s Business Inflation Expecta-
tions (BIE) survey of firms in the Sixth Federal Reserve District over three years. They evaluate how
well these expectations compare to professional forecasters, how the content of these data compare to
households’ inflation expectations and how well these expectations predict future inflation. Gennaioli
et al. (2016) examine how corporate investment plans and investment are well explained by CFOs ex-
pectations of earnings growth. Like our paper, they also ask whether expectations affect behaviour
and whether expectations are rational. Our focus is, however, different from these existing papers: we
explore a range of expectations variables, including but not limited to prices and wages, and seek to
provide a range of stylized facts about the determinants of expectations and whether they matter for
pricing outcomes.
In exploring the link between expectations and outcomes, our paper also connects to the large time-series
literature on the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (for example, Gali and Gertler (1999), Sbordone (2002)
and Sbordone (2005)). In aggregate data, price expectations of firms are not observable. Estimation
hence needs to rely on the rational expectations hypothesis and the method of instrumental variables.
But, in an exhaustive survey of this literature covering more than one hundred papers, Mavroedis et al.
(2014) argue that the time-series literature is subject to weak instrument problems. This means that the
results are not robust to even minor perturbation of the set of instruments. Unlike with macroeconomic
data, we actually observe individual firm expectations of their own future price changes together with
their subsequent out-turns. Conditional on fixed effects, we use Bayesian model averaging to show that
price expectations are a robust determinant of actual price setting in 99 percent of the 131,072 possible
combinations of our model.
The remainder of the paper proceeds in the following way: In the next section we describe the survey
in more detail, discuss its reliability and describe some broad trends in firms’ expectations. Section 3
then explores influences on expectations formation. The link between past price increases and expected
future price increases is explored in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 evaluates the rationality of firms’
expectations. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Industrial Trends Survey and its Properties
2.1 The ITS survey
Our data come from the UK’s Confederation of British Industry (CBI). The CBI runs a number of
surveys but the most detailed for our purpose is the the quarterly Industrial Trends Survey (ITS)
which covers manufacturing firms. Although the full survey began in 1958, it was only in 2008 that the
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survey started to collect quantitative rather than purely qualitative data on past and expected future
price movements. Our sample period is therefore from 2008Q3 to 2016Q34, although some variables are
only available for part of the sample.5
As noted above, one of the advantages of ITS is its panel structure. We have eight years of quarterly
data and, in principle, the cross-section dimension is large with around four to five hundred firms. That
said, there is variation in the frequency for firms’ responses and not all firms appear in the survey every
quarter. Figure 1a shows the distribution of the maximum number of consecutive quarters each firm is
observed. There is a sizable number of firms for which we observe data for a few consecutive quarters
and the panel is therefore unbalanced.6 Moreover, as figure 1b shows, the response pattern of large
firms (those reporting at least two hundred employees in their first return) is not very different from
that of small firms (those reporting fewer than two hundred employees in their first return). A slightly
higher proportion of large firms, however, responds to the survey only once.
For both large and small firms, the number of exits and re-entrants is large relative to the sample size
(there are periods of substantial, although often temporary, non-response by firms). In large part, the
reason for this is that the ITS is intended to provide a rapid snap-shot of the state of the economy.
Therefore, late respondents are only followed up within a set time frame after the official closing date
of the survey. That time period usually amounts to one or two days.
The nature of the data therefore places two restrictions on our analysis. First, to exploit the panel
structure of our data, we restrict attention to firms who appear for four or more consecutive quarters.7
Secondly, there is an inconsistency in the time horizon for different variables. The data are quarterly but
some variables refer to three month changes and others to twelve month changes (this is particularly
true of the wage and price data). In order to avoid the risk of spurious results generated by serial
correlation, we limit our analysis of the twelve-month variables to periods which do not overlap. Taken
together, these factors mean that the number of usable observations per firm is somewhat smaller than
would be the case were a complete quarterly panel available.
We start by noting that, as is implicit above, the survey asks businesses to report the number of
employees in one of nine categories 8. The categorical nature of these data limits their use in estimation,
4Very few data were collected in 2008 Q1 or 2008 Q2 so for practical purposes our data begin in 2008Q3.
5Data on output relative to capacity are, for example, available only from 2011Q1. Similarly, although the qualitative
data on new orders, employment and costs have been collected for many years, they are available on a basis coherent with
the data on price and wage expectations only from 2011Q1.
6Over the twenty-six quarters between 2008 and 2016 (for the price growth expectations variable) the average number
of quarterly returns from each respondent is 7.5 but the median is 4. Out of the 1919 firms which reply to the survey
over this period, only four firms provide complete records for the full sample period.
7We view the choice of four quarters as a reasonable trade-off. A larger number will limit the sample size, but with
fewer we will not be able to exploit the panel fully.
80-49, 50-99, 100-199, 200-249, 250-499, 500-999,1000-1999,2000-4999 and 5000+ employees
6
Figure 1: The Distribution of the Maximum Number of Consecutive Observations
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(b) By Size of Firm when first observed
Source: CBI data
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the maximal number of consecutive observations we observe
for each firm.
but they allow us to compare the size structure of our sample with that of the manufacturing sector as
a whole.
The survey responses of which we make use are as follows:
Prices and Wages: Given the attention paid to inflation and wage expectations in modern macroe-
conomic theory, we are particularly interested in the quantitative measures of firms’ expected and actual
price and wage changes. The panel element to these questions is one of the most interesting aspects of
this survey. But, the survey also contains useful information about firms’ perceptions of price and wage
changes over the past year. The key questions about prices are:
• What has been the percentage change over the past 12 months in your firm’s own average output
price for goods sold into UK markets?
• What is expected to occur over the next 12 months?
Similar questions are asked about wages:
• What has been the percentage change over the past 12 months in your firm’s wage/salary cost
per person employed (including overtime and bonuses)?
• What is expected to occur over the next 12 months?
Firms can answer the price questions by choosing one of ten buckets covering the range -10% to 10%,
by answering zero or by entering their own answer manually. This gives a good degree of granularity.9
9Specifically, the buckets are −8.1 to −10%; −6.1 to −8%; −4.1 to −6%; −2.1 to −4%; −0.1 to −2%; no change; 0.1
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Respondents to the wage question are given a choice of eleven buckets 10 Manual answers largely still fall
within these ranges and to harmonize the reporting, we assign each manual answer to its corresponding
bucket. If the manual answers lie outside the bucket ranges, they are allocated to the largest bucket on
either side.11
In addition to the data on expected and past changes in wages and prices, the survey collects a range
of qualitative information about the past and near future. Four topics in particular are of interest here.
New Orders: Excluding seasonal variations, what has been the trend over the last three months
(expected trends for the next three months) with regard to the volume of new orders?
Employment: Excluding seasonal variations, what has been the trend over the last three months
(expected trends for the next three months) with regard to the volume of employment?
Unit Costs: Excluding seasonal variations, what has been the trend over the last three months (ex-
pected trends for the next three months) with regard to costs per unit of output?
In contrast to the questions on wages and prices, the responses to the questions on new orders, em-
ployment and unit costs are qualitative. Respondents answer “Down”, “No change” or “Up”. As noted
earlier, these questions relate to periods of three months rather than periods of a year (the case for the
price and wage variables). These quarterly data therefore do not refer to overlapping periods.
We also make use of a question the survey asks on capacity:
Capacity utilisation: What is your current rate of operation as a percentage of full capacity? The
response to this is quantitative.
Other questions: Finally we should record that the survey asks a range of questions on topics such
as investment intentions and business confidence which we do not explore in this paper.
to 2%; 2.1 to 4%; 4.1 to 6%; 6.1 to 8% and 8.1 to 10%.
10With ranges −2% to −1.1%; −1% to −0.1%; 0%; 0.1% to 1%; 1.1% to 2%; 2.1% to 3%; 3.1% to 4%; 4.1% to 5%;
5.1% to 6%; 6.1% to 7% and 7.1% to 8%.
11This does not affect our results as fewer than 1% of all answers are entered manually.
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2.2 A first look at the data
We begin by presenting summary statistics for the variables we study. Table 1 shows the mean and
standard deviation of the continuous variables collected in the survey together with the relevant macroe-
conomic variables we use. Table 2 then shows the proportion of responses in each category for the
discrete variables. It is noticeable that firms report, on average, slightly lower rates of price increase
than measured by the output price indices for manufacturing as a whole. In contrast, expected and
past wage growth are both close to each other and close to the rate of growth of Average Weekly Earn-
ings (AWE), the official measure of aggregate wages. For the discrete variables, we can see that, when
describing past experience, more firms report rises or falls than they did in expectation. This is entirely
consistent with outturns being subject to shocks not anticipated when expectations were formed. The
effect is particularly marked for growth in new orders. We will return to the issue of forecast errors
when we look at the rationality of firms’ expectations.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Continuous Variables % p.a.
Variable name Mean S.D. N
Survey variables
Expected price growth 1.01 2.53 2,163
Expected wage growth 1.96 1.30 2,179
Past price growth 0.80 3.00 2,179
Past wage growth 1.97 1.45 2,176
Rate of operation (%) 79.43 16.17 2,179
Macroeconomic and industry-level variables
Output price growth (2-digit) 1.22 2.78
BoE Inflation Report inflation forecast 1.96 0.61
BoE Inflation Report growth forecast 2.43 0.43
Consumer Price Index inflation 1.95 1.54
Average Weekly Earnings growth 1.80 0.86
Source: CBI and ONS data
Notes: The Table reports mean, standard deviation and number of observations for the continuous
variables used in our analysis. Wage and price growth rates are shown over four quarters.
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Categorical Survey Variables
Variable name Fall No Change Rise N
Expected new orders growth 19.3% 55.5% 25.2% 2,179
Expected employment growth 13.9% 67.4% 18.7% 2,179
Expected unit cost growth 9.1% 67.0% 23.9% 2,179
Past new orders growth 30.1% 40.4% 29.5% 2,179
Past employment growth 16.8% 59.5% 23.7% 2,179
Past unit cost growth 10.0% 64.5% 25.5% 2,179
Source: CBI data
Notes: The Table reports the percentage of fall, no change and rise for the categorical survey variables
used in our analysis.
Table 3 shows the correlations between the survey variables, both continuous and categorical. We use
polyserial correlations between continuous and discrete variables and polychoric correlations between
pairs of discrete variables (Olsson (1979)). There are strong correlations (±0.4 or greater)between past
and expected future price increases, and between past and expected future increases in wage rates and
unit costs. There is also a clear correlation between movements in employment and new orders, both
past and future, as might be expected. The rate of operation is also negatively correlated with the
below-capacity working as are past changes in the volume of new orders.
Lower, but still material correlations, in the range of ±0.3 to ±0.39 are found between expected move-
ments in costs and expected movements in firm prices, and also between expected movements in employ-
ment and expected movements in wages. Past cost increases are correlated with expected movements in
prices and with past price movements. There is also an element of persistence in employment growth.
Finally past increases in sales volume are correlated with a higher rate of operation, and firms with past
employment growth are less likely to report below-capacity working. These correlations are interesting
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Table 3: Correlations between Survey Variables
Exp. Exp. Exp. Exp. Exp.
price wage cost empl. orders
growth growth growth growth growth
Variable type C C Q Q Q
Exp. wage growth 0.25
Exp. cost growth 0.35 0.12
Exp. empl. Growth 0.19 0.32 0.03
Exp. orders growth 0.14 0.23 -0.02 0.47
Past price growth 0.58 0.2 0.24 0.14 0.06
Past wage growth 0.13 0.53 0.03 0.16 0.1
Past cost growth 0.33 0.12 0.61 0 -0.01
Past empl. Growth 0.19 0.3 0.07 0.37 0.24
Past orders growth 0.2 0.29 0 0.4 0.43
Rate of operation 0.09 0.19 0.02 0.17 0.12
Past Past Past Past Past
price wage cost empl. orders
growth growth growth growth growth
Variable type C C Q Q Q
Past wage growth 0.2
Past cost rise 0.31 0.05
Past employment rise 0.15 0.26 0.06
Past orders rise 0.13 0.16 -0.04 0.49
Rate of operation (C) 0.09 0.19 0.01 0.26 0.32
Source: CBI and ONS data
Notes: The table shows correlations between the variables used from the Industrial Trends Survey with correlations of at
least ±0.3 in bold. Variables treated as continuous are marked (C) and qualitative variables (Q). The table shows Pearson
correlations between variables when both are continuous, polyserial correlations when one is continuous and the other
qualitative and polychoric correlations between qualitative variables. The correlations are estimated only for observations
at least four quarters apart in order to avoid the risk of spurious correlation for those variables which relate to one year
in the past or future. All correlations are estimated from the same sample.
and seem consistent with common theoretical views that activity measures are likely to be correlated
with the rate of operation and the output gap. They do not, however, show material connections
between the rate of operation (capacity utilisation) and expectations of price increases.
Overall, these correlations reveal several important facts about data. It is noteworthy that even in the
absence of any more sophisticated econometric analysis, the correlations are strongest where intuition
and theory suggest they should be, such as between price expected price growth and past price growth.
Indeed, the strength of these ‘raw’ correlations is likely responsible for the robustness of the econometric
results we present later on in this paper.
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2.3 The distribution of price and wage growth expectations
Of course, an interesting feature of microeconomic data, missing from macroeconomic aggregates and
simple descriptive statistics, is the heterogeneity in the individual data. In fact, there is significant
dispersion in firms’ expectations and perceptions of price growth. Figure 2 shows the standard deviation
of expected and past firm price growth in the ITS. The means of these series are reported again for
reference. It is interesting that the degree of dispersion is relatively stable over time, despite the
aggregate fluctuations in inflation and the large movements in average expectations and actual price
growth during the recession period, which is consistent with empirical findings for the US reported by
Nakamura et al. (2018). But, to explore the dispersion further, figures 3a and 3b show the distribution
of expected price and wage growth in the ITS. Most of the responses are between 0 and 5 percent,
which seems very reasonable given the medium-term inflation target of 2 percent and the shorter-term
variation in inflation observed over this period. There are however, a sizable minority of price responses
outside this range, both negative and positive, and there is clear evidence of clustering at zero. Very
few firms, however, expect the wages that they pay to fall.
This variation does not necessarily mean that the dispersion is noise or error, but instead that there are
likely to be genuine reasons for why firms’ price movements differ (different firm level shocks, different
markets etc). Bryan et al. (2014), Kumar et al. (2015) and Afrouzi (2017) also provide evidence of
dispersion in firms’ inflation expectations, and this also seems to be the case for UK manufacturing
firms’. Coibion et al. (2018) identify inattention to recent conditions as a primary source of differences
in expectations.
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Figure 2: Cross-section Averages and Standard Deviations of Expected and Perceived Past Price
Growth
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2.4 A comparison with other manufacturing data
Before proceeding with any formal analysis, it is useful to provide some preliminary evidence regarding
the reliability and representativeness of the data. We do this in three parts. First we show that, while
the ITS survey reports disproportionately on large firms, in terms of regional and sectoral coverage
it is reasonably representative of the sector. Secondly, we show that the aggregated survey data on
prices and wages line-up with aggregate time-series trends from official statistics. Thirdly, we examine
a number of specific features of the survey.
2.4.1 How representative is the ITS survey for the UK manufacturing sector?
As with many non-statutory surveys, the respondents are drawn from a range of trade directories and
related databases. They are not limited to members of the CBI. But of course participation is voluntary,
and an important question is therefore how far the CBI survey is representative of manufacturing firms
in the UK. As noted earlier, the panel dimension is somewhat unbalanced and the survey is intended
to be a snap-shot of the economy each quarter. It is possible that these features might bias our results.
In this section we explore this further. Overall, we find that, relative to the Government’s Business
Statistics Database, the sampling frame for official surveys, the data are broadly reflective of the actual
distribution of UK manufacturing firms by sector and the overall economy by geography.
Tables 4 to 6 show how the sample12 of firms in the CBI survey compares with the distribution of
enterprises in the UK economy as a whole. As can be seen from Table 4, the ITS has very good
coverage across different sized firms. The survey does, however, have an over-representation of large
enterprises but this feature, of course, ensures that a relatively small sample can cover a fairly large
proportion of the economy and, to the extent that the experiences of large firms are different from
those of small firms, is likely to enhance the ability of the survey to represent the circumstances of the
economy as a whole. In the last column of table 4 we show the proportion of people employed across
firms in different size categories. While it is true that small firms are under-represented relative to
their number in the economy in the ITS, they are, in fact, over-represented relative to their importance
as employers. Table 5 considers the subcomponents of manufacturing. We can see that there is some
broad consistency between the ITS and there is good coverage across sectors. That said, it is inevitable
that some sectors are over-represented and others are under-represented.
12The statistics for the CBI survey are calculated from the distribution of those observations used in our statistical
analysis. These are a subset of the full set of responses. The distribution was not, however, materially different when the
full set of responses was considered. The data for the UK economy are the averages of the relevant shares for each year
from 2008 to 2016 and are derived from the Business Statistics Database. Secure access is provided to this by the Office
of National Statistics for approved researchers.
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Another dimension of interest is whether the ITS is representative geographically. The regional distri-
bution, shown in table 6 is close to that of the economy as a whole13, although the South-East and East
Anglia are somewhat under-represented (with the other regions then over-represented).
The tables in this section reassure us that the ITS provides good coverage across size, region and
subsector. That said, there are some under- and over-representation, particularly with respect to
smaller firms as one might expect. When we want to compare the survey with aggregate data it is
helpful to adjust for the fact that the sample is not fully representative. We do that on the basis of the
composition by industrial subsector as shown in Table 5, reweighting by employment as described in
Appendix B. These reweighted data are used to construct figures 4 and 5.
Otherwise we treat each respondent equally in our analysis so as to build up a picture of average firm
behaviour. This is in line with our focus on testing the hypotheses of efficient information processing,
rationality and forward-looking behaviour at the firm level in this paper.
13A small number of firms in the Business Statistics Database are not classified to a region.
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Table 4: The Distribution of Enterprises by Number of Employees
CBI survey UK economy Employment
1-199 78.48% 99.01% 53.66%
200-499 12.48% 0.67% 12.86%
500-4999 8.03% 0.30% 22.50%
5000+ 1.01% 0.02% 10.97%
Source: CBI and ONS data.
N otes: The first two columns show the distribution of the number of firms classified by employment in
the CBI survey and the British economy. The third column shows the proportion of people employed
in firms in each size category.
Table 5: The Distribution of Enterprises by Broad SIC
Food Textiles Wood Chemicals Metals Machinery Other
Drink Clothing Paper etc Computers Transport Manuf.
Tobacco Printing Electrical
2-digit SIC 10-12 13-15 16-18 19-23 24-27 28-30 31-33
CBI Survey 6.5% 7.6% 8.5% 19.8% 30.7% 21.1% 5.9%
UK Economy 6.0% 7.0% 18.5% 10.0% 28.7% 10.5% 19.3%
Employment 15.4% 4.3% 10.5% 16.9% 23.6% 18.7% 10.6%
Source: CBI and ONS data.
N otes: The first two rows show the distribution of the number of firms classified by broad SIC category
in the CBI survey and the British economy. The third column shows the proportion of people employed
in firms in each industrial category.
Table 6: The Distribution of Enterprises by Region
CBI UK Economy Employment
Survey Count
North 13.4% 14.3% 15.0%
Yorks & Humbs 11.4% 9.0% 10.2%
E Midlands 10.6% 8.9% 9.6%
W. Midlands 13.6% 11.0% 11.9%
E Anglia 5.6% 10.3% 9.5%
London and South-East 19.9% 24.6% 21.9%
South-West 9.5% 8.8% 7.6%
Wales 6.0% 4.1% 4.9%
Scotland 8.1% 6.4% 6.5%
N. Ireland 1.9% 2.7% 2.9%
Source: CBI and ONS data.
N otes: The first two columns show the distribution of the number of firms classified by broad SIC
category in the CBI survey and the British economy. The third column shows the proportion of people
employed in firms in each region.
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2.4.2 How does the ITS survey compare to official data?
Prices and wages. As another reliability check, it is useful to explore how well averages of these
price and wage survey data line-up with other, official, time series. Figure 4a reports average expected
and perceived price growth from the ITS together with output price growth over the last four quarters
in the manufacturing sector (based on the official producer price index) and aggregate consumer price
inflation (from the Office for National Statistics) over the same period. The picture presented by the
ITS data is similar to that shown by the producer price output index. At the beginning of the financial
crisis, expected and perceived price changes fell sharply to about -0.5% which is about the same as the
observed value of producer price inflation in the manufacturing sector at this time.
Compared to output price inflation, the co-movement between expected and perceived price growth
and official consumer price inflation is weaker, although the broad dynamics over the period are still
similar. In particular, there is a noticeable level difference between the ITS average measures and the
aggregate CPI inflation series. Firms’ expected own price changes average around 1%, which is below
realized consumer price inflation rates during the period in question.14 In terms of this level gap,
which is evident in Figure 4a, the largest factor accounting for this difference is probably that output
prices were less affected than consumer prices by the sharp rise in import prices following sterling’s
depreciation in 2007-8 together with the subsequent increase in raw material prices. Producer prices
are also net of Value Added Tax.
Turning to the wage data, Figure 4b compares the survey data averages for actual and expected wage
growth with the UK Office for National Statistics measure of Average Weekly Earnings for the private
sector. The aggregate data cover regular pay only, which removes the volatility associated with bonus
payments.15 Even though the survey does not fully mirror the short-term movements shown by Average
Weekly Earnings, it reflects the general decline in pay growth after the financial crisis.
The congruence between the aggregate properties of the ITS and the official data reassures us of the
reliability of the survey, and echoes Lui et al. (2011). They examined the firms’ responses about output
movements in the period before the 2008-2009 recession, and showed that the qualitative answers were
coherent with the answers the same firms provided in quantitative returns to the UK Office for National
Statistics.
14A similar asymmetry has been documented for firms in New Zealand who systematically expect inflation to materialize
above actual inflation (Coibion et al. (2018)).
15The effect of bonus payments is present even in the seasonally adjusted data.
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Figure 4: Perceptions and Expectations of Output Price and Wage Growth
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Activity and unit costs. We are similarly interested in the survey data on orders, employment and
costs. Although these are ordinal, Panels (A) to (C) of Figure 5 show respectively the proportions of
firms reporting past and expected future increases in employment, new orders and unit costs. In each
graph the left-hand axis indicates the proportions of the sample reporting a past or expected increase in
the variable in question, while the right-hand axis shows the growth in the macro-economic variable to
which we might expect the survey response to be related. Panel (D) shows the sample average figures
for capacity utilisation on the left-hand axis with the unemployment rate on the right-hand axis. For
the first three of these variables, the co-movement between recent firm experience and expectations is
striking, but, except for unit costs, the relationship to aggregate data is less obvious. It is noticeable
that movements in reported capacity utilisation seem quite unrelated with the aggregate unemployment
rate. To the extent that firms’ marginal costs depend on their capacity utilisation, this suggests that
labour market conditions may not be a good proxy for marginal cost.
2.4.3 Four further comparisons
In this section we consider four additional issues to help ensure the reliability of the survey and the
validity of our approach. First, we count the number of firms that always provide the same answer.16
A high incidence might lead us to question the accuracy of the reporting, but this does not seem to be
the case. Of the 1004 firms which respond three or more times, 63 give the same answer to the question
about past price increases on every occasion. Out of the 672 which give six or more answers, twenty-one
provide the same answer to the question each time. Forty-four of the sixty-three respondents in the
16A study of qualitative survey data for output in the Netherlands found that about fifteen per cent of firms always
gave the same answer. On discovering this, the Netherlands Bureau of Statistics approached respondents to ask why that
was the case.
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Figure 5: Cross-sectional Averages of Survey Data on New Orders, Employment, Unit Costs and
Capacity Utilisation, together with Related Macroeconomic Variables
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first case and nineteen in the second case reported zero on each occasion.
Secondly, we consider whether some respondents may misinterpret the questions by answering “no
change” when they mean that the rate of inflation rather than the price level has not changed. A recent
answering practices survey conducted by the CBI suggests, however, that this is not the case. This
pattern of answers suggests there is little evidence that the survey is contaminated by firms providing
formulaic responses.
The two final checks in Figure 6 examine the full distribution of price and wage growth expectations and
compare these with more restricted sub-samples. In panels 6a and 6b we exclude outlier firms which we
define as those reporting a change in past/expected price growth from one wave of the survey to the next
in the extreme upper and lower one per cent of the distribution in at least one response.17 The purpose
17Such firms reported a decrease in expected price growth of at least ten per cent or an increase of at least nine per
cent from one quarter to the next
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Figure 6: The Distribution of Past and Expected Price Growth for Subsamples of the Full Data Set
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N otes: The figures compare the distributions of past and expected price and wage growth using the
full sample with the distribution based on subsamples. The subsamples are: (i) Excluding outliers: this
subsample excludes firms that report a change in past/expected price or wage growth from one wave
of the survey to the next in the extreme upper and lower one per cent of the distribution in at least
one response, (ii) 10 + observations: this subsample uses only firms which provided more than ten
responses over the whole sample.
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of this is to show that firms with unusually volatile changes are not distorting the overall distribution.18
For example, if changes in the respondent materially affected the reporting for a particular firm, this
firm would be likely to show up as an outlier here. The distribution still looks similar when outliers are
excluded and our regression results are also robust to using this sample.
Given the unbalanced nature of the panel dimension, figures 6c and 6d examine whether there is
something special about firms who report more frequently. We distinguish firms which provided more
than ten responses over the whole sample. Reassuringly, the distributions still look very similar. And,
in any case, our use of firm fixed effects below will help addresses this and we will re-run our results on
the restricted sample as a robustness check.
3 What influences firms’ expectations?
In this section, we explore what factors might influence firms’ price, wage, activity and cost expectations.
Our interest is in the information that seems most relevant for the formation of different expectations.
In many standard representative agent models there is no distinction between aggregate and firm level
information, and rationality means firms fully make use of all information available. In this section
we ask two questions. First, do firms make use of all available information when forming expectations
about particular variables (e.g. price growth or new orders), or are some factors more relevant than
others? Secondly, do firms focus on aggregate conditions, or are firm-specific variables more relevant
for their expectations formation?19
3.1 Expectations of Wage and Price Growth
How well can price and wage growth expectations be predicted by actual (reported) firm-level out-turns
(e.g. new orders, employment, costs etc)? And are these more or less important than macroeco-
nomic conditions in shaping firms’ expectations? To answer these questions we consider the following
unweighted regression:
Epii,t = α+ βXt + γZi,t + νi + ei,t (1)
where Epii,t is the specific measure of firm-level expected price or wage growth. Xt are industry-
level and macroeconomic variables designed to capture the influence of aggregate factors. To capture
macroeconomic conditions, we include CPI inflation, aggregate wage growth as measured by Average
18Below, we will also re-run our regressions on this restricted sample as a robustness check.
19Afrouzi (2017) develops a model with oligopolistic competition and strategic inattention where firms may pay less
attention to aggregate developments when forming their expectations.
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Weekly Earnings (AWE) growth, the unemployment rate and import price growth. At the industry-
level, we include output price growth. In addition to out-turns, we also include measures of expected
aggregate developments which are represented using the Bank of England’s four quarter ahead CPI
inflation and GDP growth forecasts from the Inflation Report (IR).20
Zi,t are firm specific variables. Our approach is to see which backward-looking variables, proxying the
state of the firm at the time expectations are formed, seem most correlated with expectations. Zi,t
therefore includes dummies for the change in new orders, employment and costs over the previous three
months. In fact, to use each of these as an explanatory variable we need to construct two dummy
variables. The first takes a value of 1 when then response is “up” and 0 otherwise. The second takes a
value of 1 when the response is “No change” and 0 otherwise. Thus both dummies take values of 0 when
the response is “Down”. We refer to these dummies for new orders as “Past orders rise” or “Past orders
unchanged” respectively, with similar labels for employment and unit costs. We also include the current
rate of operation and a firm-specific fixed effect (νi) which should capture unobserved time-invariant
firm factors.
There is relatively little previous empirical work or theory on the determinants of firm-level inflation
expectations. This is why there is significant uncertainty around the benchmark regression. To address
this issue and systematically explore the determinants of inflation expectations in an agnostic manner,
we therefore rely on Bayesian Model Averaging.
Bayesian Model Averaging is a method designed to consider average coefficients across all possible
combinations of the regressors. In our specific application there are 214 or 16,384 models. In this
approach, the posterior model probabilities, p(M |y) where M is the model and y is the data , provide
the weights for the averaging. These posterior model probabilities can be computed by means of Bayes
rule, conditional on two elements. First, for each model M, the marginal likelihood, p(y|M) can be
derived from the posterior distribution of the parameters in each model M. The prior distribution of
the models, p(M), also needs to be specificed. Given these two inputs, it is possible to derive the model
posterior probabilities as
p(M |y) ∝ p(y|M)p(M)
As with any Bayesian approach, the results can could be influenced by the priors we set. We follow
Fernandez et al. (2001) and assume an an uninformative prior on the variance of the residuals and the
intercept for each model. For the remaining regression coefficients we use the g-prior of Zellner (1986),
setting g = 1max(N,k2) . For the distribution of these models, we set a uniform prior. If the space of
20All growth rates are annual.
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possible models is very large, the approach in the literature has been to rely on MCMC method to
approximate the likelihood. Instead, since we have only up to 16,384 models, we follow Magnus et al.
(2010) and evaluate each one of to obtain the exact likelihood. High posterior inclusion probabilities
indicate that, irrespective of the inclusion of other explanatory variables, the regressor has a strong
explanatory power and the variable is a robust predictor of the dependent variable. We argue that
this is therefore an efficient and objective way to understand which variables are the most important
determinants of firm pricing expectations in a systematic and agnostic manner.
Table 7 reports the results. Standard errors are calculated allowing for clustering by firm, except for
Bayesian Model Averaging where this is not possible. Columns 1 to 3 report the results for expected
price growth; with the models estimated over a common sample. To examine the association with
aggregate factors alone, the first column reports the results including aggregate variables only. Firms’
expected price increases seem to be correlated significantly with forecast GDP growth at an aggregate
level (proxied by the Bank of England forecast, as noted above) over the coming year. The influence
of import price growth is close to significant but not very large. Taken at face value, this suggests that
general expectations about aggregate demand may be influencing firms’ expected pricing behaviour.
The second column shows the effects of firm-specific influences only. As one might expect in theory,
firms’ expectations of future price increases are statistically significantly related to the growth in new
orders, cost growth, and capacity utilisation.
The third column then shows the combined effects of the macro and micro variables, with the parame-
ters estimated by Bayesian Model Averaging over 16,384 possible models. We can see that, of the macro
variables only import price inflation is significant, while of the firm-specific variables past cost move-
ments and the rate of operation are significant. Thus these results indicate that firms’ expectations of
price increases are informed by their own recent cost experience together the macroeconomic influence
of import prices, possibly because movements in the latter are expected to influence costs in the near
future. There is also a capacity effect, which we take to represent demand pressures. The Bayesian
analysis indicates probabilities of inclusion of 1 for the firm-specific variables and 0.93 for import costs.
This suggests that these three determinants robustly predict inflation expectations, regardless of the
inclusion of other variables in the regression model. None of the other probabilities exceeds 0.5.
Columns 4 to 6 of Table 7 report a similar pattern for expected wage growth. At the macro level forecasts
of both GDP growth and CPI inflation are significant, as is overall wage growth. Unemployment,
however, does not enter significantly into the picture. at the micro level growth in demand, represented
by past employment and past orders and capacity utilisation shows a strong influence. There is also an
23
influence from past costs, possibly reflecting some expectation of persistence of growth in labour costs.
Column 6 again reports the results of Bayesian Model Averaging. This points to a role for forecast
GDP growth and inflation at the aggregate level, together with demand effects at the micro level. All
of the variables which are significant at 5% have probabilities of inclusion greater than 0.9 except that
the dummy for past employment unchanged has a probability of inclusion of 0.64. None of the other
variables have probabilities of inclusion greater than 0.3.
In summary, price and wage growth expectations seem to be associated with firm-specific factors,
particularly rising new orders, rising employment, and a high rate of operation. Wage expectations are
also influenced by past CPI inflation and forecast GDP growth while price expectations are modestly
influenced by past import price growth. These differences may suggest a degree of bounded rationality or
inattention in the formation of expectations. These findings are consistent with Coibion et al. (2018) who
document that expectations of firms in New Zealand are best described by noisy information and rational
inattention models. This may also have implications for how monetary policy can shape expectations.
Expectations of wages and prices may be affected differentially depending on how monetary policy
influences aggregate inflation and GDP. We return to the issue of rationality below.
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3.2 Expectations of New Orders, Employment and Unit Costs
Having explored our quantitative measures of expected price and wage growth, we now turn to new
orders, employment and cost expectations. The qualitative nature of the data for these variables means
that, to examine influences on expectations, we would ideally need to use an ordered probit or logit
model. It is not possible to set up such a model except by pooling the data and neglecting firm-
specific effects due to the incidental parameter bias (Neyman and Scott (1948)). In studying influences
on expectations, therefore, we limit ourselves to a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the
expectation is for up and 0 otherwise; we refer to this dummy as “Expected Orders”, employment or
costs respectively. We then examine the influences on this using a panel logit model with fixed effects.We
convert these trichotomous variables into dichotomous variables which distinguish a rise from no change/
a fall, in effect losing the distinction between no change and fall. Specifically we estimate the following
logit discrete choice model that is not plagued by the incidental parameter bias:
P (Eyi,t = 1|Xi,t) = F (ΓXi,t) (2)
where
ΓXi,t = α+ βXt + γZi,t + νi + ei,t (3)
Eyit is the specific measure of the change in expected new orders, employment and costs. Again, Xt
are industry and macroeconomic variables and Zi,t are the same firm specific variables. We include the
same variables as in the previous section, together with past price and wage growth. Table 8 reports
the odds ratio for each variable.
As before, we examine the influence of macroeconomic variables and forecasts and then turn to the firm-
specific data. In contrast to the regression models of section 3.1, however, it is not possible to correct
for clustering with the panel logit model, and the R2 is not clearly defined. So we report z-statistics
relative to odds ratios of 1 and derived from robust standard errors together with the BIC information
criterion.
The first three columns of Table 8 consider the factors influencing expectations of new orders. Column 1
does not identify a significant role for any of the macroeconomic variables although the odds ratio of the
GDP growth forecast is close to significance. In column 2, we see that the only significant firm-specific
variable is whether firms reported past growth in new orders. When the macro and micro variables are
combined in the column 3, we find again that only the odds ratio on the dummy for a rise in past orders
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is significant. The BIC suggests that the micro equation should be preferred to both the combined and
macro equations suggesting that firms’ expectations for new orders are most importantly influenced by
their own recent experience.
Columns 4, 5 and 6 in Table 8 consider employment expectations. When only macro indicators are
considered (column 4) the aggregate GDP growth forecast appears as a significant influence on the
probability that firms will expect a rise in employment. Looking only at micro variables (column
5), past movements in new orders has a larger odds ratio, suggesting that it is more influential for
employment expectations than expectations of new orders. Firms reporting an increase/no change in
new orders were significantly more likely to expect employment to rise than those that reported a past
fall in new orders. Past employment movements, in contrast, do not seem to exert a significant influence
on expected future employment movements but past price increases do play a significant role. When
macro and micro variables are both included, the micro variables retain their significance while the odds
ratio for the GDP forecast is no longer significant at a five per cent level. The BIC for the micro equation
is, however, materially lower than for either the macro equation or the combined equation. This suggests
that expectations of employment changes are primarily influenced by firm-specific experience.
Finally, columns 7, 8 and 9 of Table 8 examine unit cost expectations. In terms of the macro variables
(column 7), import price growth increases are associated significantly with the probability that firms
expect costs to rise. The GDP growth forecast is not significant. In terms of the firm specific variables
(column 8), the only significant indicator is whether firms have just experienced a rise in unit costs.
When the macro and micro variables are combined, past movements in import prices and firm-specific
costs retain their significance while some macro variables lose significance. The BIC statistics suggest
that the micro equation should be preferred to the macro equation despite the significance of past
import costs in the combined equation.
In summary, employment expectations seem to be most correlated with the change in past firm-level
order volumes, while expected costs are correlated with the past change in firm costs and (aggregate)
import price inflation. Expectations of new orders, however, seem to be most correlated with past
movements in new orders at the firm-level. This suggests that aggregate factors, including monetary
policy, might affect only new orders and employment expectations through their effect on firm-level
variables. The exception is cost expectations where import price inflation has an impact as well. Some
expectations are therefore more directly correlated with aggregate conditions (e.g. wage expectations,
as discussed above) while others may be influenced only indirectly.
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4 Do Expectations Affect Price and Wage Setting Behaviour?
So far, we have explored which factors seem to predict firms’ expectations for a range of variables.
But, do these expectations actually matter for outcomes? In most modern macroeconomic models
expectations of firms are crucial for determining pricing behaviour and aggregate inflation dynamics.
In the New Keynesian model, for example, aggregate inflation today is related expected future inflation
and real marginal cost. The central bank’s ability to control expectations about the future can then
dramatically improve inflation outcomes today. In this section we therefore ask: Is there evidence that
firms’ expectations matter for price setting behaviour?
Much empirical work has been devoted to exploring this question using macro data. And, as mentioned
earlier, a large body of literature has focused on estimating the New Keynesian Phillips Curve directly.
But this literature has faced a number of challenges. It is unclear how to measure expectations and
the literature has often used proxies (such as using realized outcomes or measures or forecasts from a
statistical model) or expectations from aggregate survey data.
Two key strengths of our data are that the ITS has direct measures of firms’ expectations and they are
panel data. We therefore observe firms’ expectations directly and through a range of fixed effects and
variables, we are able to control for a range of possible confounders. We control for macro shocks with
time fixed effects, industry shocks with industry-time fixed effects, and individual level characteristics
with firm fixed effects. The remaining concern is that firm specific, time varying shocks, might be
driving both expectations and actual pricing behaviour. Here again, the richness of the survey helps
and we can include the full range of firm specific controls considered in Section 3. To explore if this
robustness problem persists with the observed firm level expectations variables in our survey, we apply
Bayesian Model Averaging to explore how robust our results are to regression specification.
4.1 Econometric specification
Our objective is to examine whether firms’ expectations matter for pricing behaviour today. To do this,
a natural regression specification to consider is the following:
pii,t = α
piEi,tpii,t+1 + γ
pi
xxi,t + vi,t (4)
where pii,t is firm i’s growth in prices and Ei,tpii,t+1 are their expectations for the growth in their price
for the coming period. Our main coefficient of interest is then αpi, where we would like to establish
whether this is positive and significant. xi,t are other controls, including any fixed effects. While our
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goal is not to estimate the structural parameters of a Phillips Curve, a number of models would be
consistent with a pricing relationship like equation 4. For example, in the Appendix we show that a
firm-level pricing relationship like this — where price changes depend on a firm’s expected own price
changes and marginal cost — can be derived from the common Rotemberg (1982) pricing model.21 In
this specific model, the variable xi,t reflects the time varying price markup (the inverse of real marginal
cost). We do not have any clear choice for such a variable in our dataset, but if we regard the x variables
in a less structural manner, we can think of this as a vector Xi with a range of firm-specific controls
and fixed effects that help deal control for common firm-specific factors.
In estimating equation 4 the first practical challenge is that the survey asks for growth rates over the past
twelve months and expected future growth rates over the coming twelve months. It would be incorrect
to treat these variables as though they described quarterly expected and actual price movements, raising
a question of how to handle the temporal aggregation in the data. We address the issue by assuming
that decisions are made on a quarterly basis. We therefore aggregate equation 4 by summing four
successive equations. This leads to the following expression:
pi4i,t = α
piEt−3pi4i,t+1 + γ
pi
x,k
3∑
k=0
Xi,t−k + ui,t (5)
where the superscript 4 indicates that the variable relates to the growth rate over the preceding four
quarters. The expectations term on the right-hand side of this equation has to be based on variables
which are observed at period t − 3. Strictly the X terms would become the sum over the previous 4
quarters but, for generality, we allow each quarter to have a different coefficient in equation 5. Our
interest is in whether the coefficient αpi is positive and significant, which would be evidence of a role
for expectations in current pricing decisions.22
To be as flexible as possible, and exploit the panel nature of our data, Xi,t includes a combination of
continuous controls and firm, sector and date fixed effects. For the continuous variables we include past
wage growth, the current rate of operation and the number of employees. The firm-specific controls
we use are output is below capacity, and whether there has been growth in new orders, unit costs
and employment. Because the last three variables are discrete, it is necessary, as before, to define two
dummies for each, the first indicating a rise and the second indicating no change. For each of these we
include the contemporanoues value and three lags.
21After imposing symmetry this equation then becomes the New Keynesian Phillips Curve for aggregate inflation, as
discussed in Roberts (1995), although we do not make this final step given that we already observe firm-level expectations.
Rotemberg pricing has the advantage that all firms can, in principle, make adjustments each period.
22The residual term, will now include a range of forecast errors, in addition to including vi,t, specifically: ui,t =
αpi (Ei,tpii,t+1 + Ei,t−1pii,t + Ei,t−2pii,t−1)− αpi (Ei,t−3pii,t+1 + Ei,t−3pit + Ei,t−3pii,t−1) +
∑3
k=0 vi,t−k
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We also use the same specification to explore a possible connection between wage growth over four
periods, w4i,t and the wage growth which had been expected three quarters earlier, Et−3w
4
i,t+1, evaluating
the analogous coefficient, αw.
4.2 Results
Table 9 shows the results of estimating equation 5. The columns refer to different specifications which
include different fixed effects and firm-level controls. There is a strong stability in the coefficient
estimate. It is always around 0.2-0.35 and significant at the 5% level. Columns 1 and 2 show the results
only including different fixed effects and no other controls. This maximizes the sample size, although
one may still be concerned about other time-varying firm-specific factors. Column 3 includes firm and
time-sector fixed effects (at the 2 digit SIC level), which would deal with any sector specific trends.
Columns 4-8 include firm specific controls. Specifically we include, for these models:
1. Past Wage Growth
2. Rate of Operation
3. Volume of New Orders (Dummies for Rise and No Change)
4. Employment (Dummies for Rise and No Change)
5. Unit Costs (Dummies for Rise and No Change)
with one to four lags of each variable.
Column 4 has these firm specific controls and firm fixed effects. Column 5 adds time and sector fixed
effects. Column 6 has firm and time-sector fixed effects. Column 6 is the most flexible specification and
it is favoured by the BIC. We therefore regard this as our baseline specification. Here, the coefficient
on expectations is still 0.2 and significant at the 5% level: expectations of future price increases by the
firm influence the decision to change prices today.
To examine further the robustness of our results, columns 7 and 8 estimate the baseline model of
column 6 including only firms with at least ten observations (to help address the lack of balance in the
panel) and removing firms who experience large changes in their expectations between quarters (to help
address any bias introduced by changing circumstances for the firm, e.g. if the person responding to
the survey changes). Both these sample restrictions were discussed earlier and, in table 9, make very
little difference to the parameters estimates (which remain around 0.2-0.3) but lead to a lower sample
size.
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Finally, we also report, in column (9) the results from our Bayesian Model Averaging exercise. This
explores models which include firm and time fixed effects. For the estimation to be manageable we
have to use a reduced set of firm-level controls, omitting the four lags of past wage growth and the
dummies for no change of the three qualitative variables. It shows that price expectations enter as an
important predictor in 99 percent of 131,072 price change equation models that we estimate. In other
words, unlike with the macroeconomic estimates presented in the time-series literature, our result that
past expectations are related to actual price setting is robust to many different perturbations of the
underlying regression model.
There is also a literature examining wage Phillips curves and, given our survey contains rich information
on wages and wage expectations, it is also interesting to examine whether wage expectations matter
for current wage determination. Table 10 therefore repeats the same exercise as in Table 9 for wage
expectations. Columns 1-9 refer to the same econometric specifications as with prices, although the
firm level control set now includes past price changes but not past wage changes. With Bayesian Model
Averaging the set of firm level controls is again reduced, excluding the past price changes and also
the three no change dummies. The coefficient estimate is slightly larger than for the price growth
regressions, tends to be between 0.25 and 0.4, and is always significant at the 5% level. Again, wage
expectations also seem to matter for current wage determination at the firm level and Bayesian model
averaging shows that this result is robust to regression specification.
To summarize, this section has looked for evidence that expectations matter for current price and wage
decisions at the firm-level. Our main result is that price and wage growth expectations do seem to
have a positive and significant effect on price and wage growth. This is robust to a wide range of fixed
effects and firm-level controls. Without a specific structural model in mind, it is not possible to map
these estimate to structural parameters but, as we have noted, the general econometric specification we
estimate can be motived from a simple firm-level type pricing relationship such as Rotemberg (1982).
5 Are Expectations Rational?
In previous sections we have provided evidence that expectations are associated with fundamentals,
and have shown evidence that they influence current pricing decisions. But, are expectations rational?
The rationality of expectations plays an important part of modern macroeconomic models and implies
that firms’ use all available information and do not systematically make mistakes. A strong degree
of rationality and forward-looking behaviour then produces powerful effects of policies such as those
associated with forward guidance in modern macro models (Woodford (2012)). Coibion et al. (2017)
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Table 9: The Relationship between Expected and Actual Price Growth
The dependent variable is past price growth.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Exp. Price Growth (lag 3) 0.355∗∗ 0.356∗∗ 0.317∗∗ 0.271∗∗ 0.221∗ 0.218∗ 0.217∗ 0.267∗ 0.290∗∗
(8.05) (7.86) (6.53) (2.97) (2.28) (2.16) (2.12) (2.42) (4.00)
Observations 1968 1968 1960 670 670 670 632 574 688
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.15 0.35 0.18 0.24 0.68 0.67 0.67 –
BIC 8762.6 8807.1 9413.9 2598.8 2650.7 2147.6 2091.0 1670.1 –
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: CBI and ONS data
Notes: The table reports the coefficient on expected price growth in equation (5) for various com-
binations of control variables. Except for model (9) standard errors are robust. The models are as
follows:
1. Firm fixed effects.
2. Firm and time fixed effects.
3. Firm and interactive time/SIC 2-digit sector fixed effects.
4. Firm fixed effects. Firm level controls
5. Firm and time fixed effects. Firm-level controls.
6. Firm and interactive time/sector fixed effects. Firm level controls.
7. Firm and interactive time/sector fixed effects. Firm level controls. Only firms with 10+ responses.
8. Firm and interactive time/sector fixed effects. Firm level controls. Outliers removed (see figures
6a and 6b and related discussion).
9. Firm and time fixed effects. Firm-level controls. Estimated by Bayesian model averaging
Table 10: The Relationship between Expectations and Actual Wage Growth
The dependent variable is past wage growth.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Exp. Wage Growth (lag 3) 0.380∗∗ 0.353∗∗ 0.325∗∗ 0.305∗∗ 0.305∗∗ 0.282∗ 0.283∗ 0.229 0.316∗∗
(8.41) (7.30) (5.41) (3.37) (3.37) (2.33) (2.32) (1.80) (4.87)
Observations 1975 1975 1967 664 664 664 626 491 686
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.16 0.28 0.13 0.13 0.54 0.53 0.71 –
BIC 5739.1 5836.5 6705.1 1837.8 1837.8 1490.6 1467.0 603.7 –
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: CBI and ONS data
Notes: The table reports the coefficient on expected price growth in equation (5) for various combi-
nations of control variables. Except for model (9) the standard errors are robust. The models are as
follows:
1. Firm fixed effects.
2. Firm and time fixed effects.
3. Firm and interactive time/SIC 2-digit sector fixed effects.
4. Firm fixed effects. Firm level controls
5. Firm and time fixed effects. Firm-level controls.
6. Firm and interactive time/sector fixed effects. Firm level controls.
7. Firm and interactive time/sector fixed effects. Firm level controls. Only firms with 10+ responses.
8. Firm and interactive time/sector fixed effects. Firm level controls. Outliers removed (see figures
6a and 6b and related discussion).
9. Firm and time fixed effects. Firm-level controls. Estimated by Bayesian model averaging
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show, however, that growing micro evidence suggests departures from rationality. This is an issue we can
now study with our micro data. In the remainder of this section, we explore this issue by first exploring
the properties of forecast errors before proceeding to more formal rationality tests. For our continuous
price and wage forecast errors, we are particularly interested in their relationship to aggregate shocks,
which we proxy using official Bank of England’s forecast errors.
5.1 Properties of forecast errors
We first use the ITS survey to construct forecast errors. Before proceeding with any formal tests of
rationality it is interesting to examine these forecast errors more closely and see how they correlate with
each other, and with aggregate shocks.
For prices we define the 1-year ahead forecast error at time t as pi4ft+4 − êpit+4 ≡ pˆie4t+4f , the difference
between the reported price increases over the last year, pi4ft+4, and the forecast made a year earlier,
pˆie4t+4f , with w
4f
t+4 and wˆ
e4
t+4f the corresponding variables for wage growth. These variables are denoted
Price Error and Wage Error respectively. The remainder of this subsection uses descriptive methods to
relate these forecast errors to macro-economic forecasting errors, focusing on the four quarter forecasts
for inflation and GDP growth made by the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee. Given the
time and effort devoted to these macro forecasts these are a particularly useful benchmark.
Figure 7a shows the average forecast errors in price growth for the sample period. The chart also shows
bounds calculated as ± 1.96 standard error of the mean on each side of the mean, and the comparable
forecast errors for CPI inflation (CPI Error) and GDP growth (GDP Error) in the Monetary Policy
Committee’s Inflation Forecast four quarters ahead. The chart suggests a strong correlation between
firms’ errors in price expectations and the forecasting errors made by the Monetary Policy Committee.
Figure 7b shows the corresponding forecast errors for wage growth. The correlations in figure 7b are
somewhat less obvious, although these errors are not necessarily so closely related to GDP and inflation.
Next we present summary statistics for the forecast errors in Table 11. The mean error for price growth
is -0.4 percentage points. This may not seem all that large, but it is several times larger than the Bank
of England’s error for CPI inflation (0.07pp). It is also clear that the dispersion of forecast errors is
more than twice that of the MPC’s forecast errors. This is not that surprising given the dispersion in
expectations shown earlier, but certainly motivates our more detailed analysis below.
We are also interested in the forecast errors in the qualitative variables. We summarise these in the
following way. Since the variables are trichotomous, we can identify those observations for which the
outturn is in a higher category than the expectation, those for which it is in the same category and
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Figure 7: Forecast Errors in continuous survey variables compared to the Bank of England’s Monetary
Policy Committee forecasts
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Source: CBI and ONS data and Inflation Report Notes: The Figure reports forecast errors in price and
wage survey forecasts compared to the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee CPI and GDP
forecasts
those for which it is lower. We show the proportion of observations with each of these outcomes in
Table 12 and use the variables to evaluate the polychoric and polyserial correlations show in Table 13.
This classification is less than ideal; a firm which expected new orders to fall and in fact experienced
a much sharper fall in new orders would be shown here in the middle category, while a firm whose
outturn was just below its expectation, but enough to move it down a category would be classified in
the first category. While this classification therefore, does not form the basis for the formal rationality
tests presented below, it does give an indication of the degree to which outturns are different from
expectations. It should be noted that these errors relate to forecasts made one period ago, while the
wage, price and macroeconomic forecast errors relate to a forecast interval of four quarters. We denote
these variables Unit Cost Error, New Orders Error and Employment Error.
Summary statistics for the forecast errors of the ordinal data are shown in Table 12. The proportion of
firms for whom employment, new orders and unit costs were “ as expected” is larger than the proportion
experiencing lower or higher forecast errors, although for all three variables a sizable proportion of firms
experience forecast errors. These were also relatively symmetric with similar proportions on the upside
and the downside altuough there is a suggestion that orders were more likely to come in below rather
than above expectations.
Finally, we explore the correlations between the firm-level forecast errors. It is an interesting question
whether errors on one variable might be associated with errors on another variable. For example, if
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Table 11: Summary Statistics for Forecast Errors
Mean Std. Dev.
Price Error -0.44 3.6
Wage Error -0.15 1.7
CPI Error 0.07 1.45
GDP Error -0.71 2.10
Source: Bank of England, CBI and ONS data
Notes: The table reports mean and standard deviation of price and wage survey forecast errors together
with the corresponding forecast errors of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee.
Table 12: Categorical Forecast Errors
Employment New Orders Unit Costs
Lower than Expected 16.9% 30.7% 18.1%
As Expected 64.1% 46.4% 64.8%
Higher than Expected 19% 22.9% 17.1%
Observations 1412 1402 1389
Source: CBI data
Notes: The table reports the proportions of different outcomes for the forecast errors in the categorical
survey variables. The different outcomes are: (i) lower than expected : the out-turn is in a lower category
than expected, (ii) as expected : the out-turn is in the same category than expected, (iii) higher than
expected : the out-turn is in a higher category than expected.
costs end up higher than expected, perhaps prices are raised more than anticipated. It is worth stressing
that the correlations in Table 13 are in no way causal — and we think it would be difficult to make
such causal statements — but these statistics seem a useful way of examining the possible relationships
between the variables.
Table 13 does not point to any strong correlations23 . Even the largest, between errors in new orders
and errors in employment, is only 0.37. Nevertheless, it is of some note that the errors firms make
in forecasting wage and price changes are much more strongly correlated with aggregate shocks than
they are with firms’ own errors in forecasting unit costs, employment or new orders. On top of this the
correlation with GDP forecast errors is larger than that with inflation forecast errors. That offers some,
albeit weak, evidence that pricing is influenced by macroeconomic influences. We note the contrast
between the pattern of shocks shown here and the results of table 3 which shows a clear correlation
between past unit cost and past price movements. It is, of course, possible that the correlation arises
entirely through the expected components of past price and unit costs but that conclusion would
probably strain the data more than is sensible given the nature of the qualitative forecast errors.
23 The correlations are calculated using only observations at least four quarters apart so as to avoid the problem of
spurious correlation, while figure 7a shows the quarterly means of all the data and thus suggests a stronger correlation.
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Table 13: Correlations between Forecast Errors: 2009Q2-2016Q3
Price Wage CPI GDP Unit Cost New Orders
Error Error Error Error Error Error
Wage Error 0.22
CPI Error 0.21 0.14
GDP Error 0.26 0.28 0.21
Unit Cost Error 0.01 0.04 0.07 -0.09
New Ord. Error 0.01 0.08 0.03 -0.01 0.00
Employment Error 0.02 0.11 0.04 -0.02 0.07 0.37
Source: Bank of England, CBI and ONS data
N otes: The table shows polychoric correlations between categorical variables and polyserial correlations
when one variable is categorical and the other is cardinal.
5.2 Are Survey Forecasts Rational?
Given the dispersion in expectations documented in Section 2 and the forecast errors constructed above,
we will now formally assess the rationality of the expectations in the ITS.
5.2.1 Prices and Wages
We first examine the rationality of the price and wage growth expectations. We are interested in both
the role of macroeconomic shocks and evidence of rationality conditional on these. To do this, we use
the following regression equation for price forecast errors.
êpif,t+4 = α
pi
f + θ
pipipˆie4t+4f + θ
piwwˆe4t+4f + β
piXi,t + γ
piZt+4 + 
pi
f,t+4 (6)
Xi,t is a vector of variables observed at time t for firm i; we consider the dummy variables which take
values of 1 if costs, employment and the volume of new sales are expected to rise in the quarter when
the forecast was produced. We also use the rate of operation and the observed past increases in wages
and prices at the time the forecast was produced. Zt+4 are the macroeconomic forecast errors plotted in
Figures 7a and 7b. In an alternative specification, we replace macroeconomic forecast errors with time
fixed effects. It is not possible to estimate both γ and δ since individual date dummies are collinear
with aggregate variables, but the values of γpi may themselves be informative.
For time series data, expectations are rational if both the constant and the coefficient on the forecast
value are equal to zero. For panel data, rationality thus requires that there should be no fixed effects
so that for each individual firm, forecast errors are zero in expectation conditional on the information
that was available to the forecaster (Rossi and Sekhposyan (2015)).24 We adopt a weaker formulation
24 This is true only under covariance stationarity and a quadratic loss function.
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of the null hypothesis of forecast rationality,
H0 = θ̂
pipi = θ̂piw = β̂pi = 0. (7)
So if H0 is rejected, then we can safely reject the hypothesis of rationality.
The rationality of forecasts for wage growth can similarly be tested by estimating the regression equation
êwf,t+4 = α
w
f + θ
wpipˆie4t+4f + θ
wwwˆe4t+4f + β
wXi,t + γ
wZt+4 + δ
wDt+4 + 
w
f,t+4. (8)
Earlier, we showed that there might be persistence in expectations which may lead to forecast errors
that are correlated over time. As a result, the panel data model in equations (6) and (8) are estimated
using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation25, except where Bayesian
Model Averaging is used.
Table 14 reports the results from estimating the model in equations 6 and 8. The models with firm-
specific controls can be estimated only for the period 2012q1-2016q3. For reasons of comparability
we therefore also show the first two models estimated for this period; the conclusions over rationality
remain, however broadly unchanged when these models are estimated for the whole period.
In table 14 we show the results of the test for four different specifications. The first two columns
show, for prices and wages, that forecast errors are strongly negatively related to the expectations
themselves. A high expected value tends to be associated with an out-turn well below forecast, even
after we include firm fixed effects. We can also see, in column (1) that, for prices, macro forecast shocks
for both inflation and economic growth are positively associated with out-turns higher than expected,
but there is no evidence of such effects with wages (column 2). Finally we can see that firms which
had experienced sharp price or wage increases in the four quarters leading up to the forecasts tended
to have out-turns lower than forecast. Since the coefficients on past values are significant even though
we have also included the forecasts, this effect is in addition to the average influence of past out-turns
on forecasts. In the subsequent columns we include time dummies as well as firm fixed effects, but the
relationship with the forecast and with the past out-turn is very similar to that shown in columns (1)
and (2).
Finally in columns (5) and (6) we show the results of the models of columns (3) and (4) estimated
by Bayesian Model Averaging. This shows high probabilities of inclusion for the variables which are
statistically significant and low probabilities otherwise. Searching over two hundred and fifty-six models
25This setting implies that the estimation error is captured under the null hypothesis which means that we adopt the
asymptotic framework of Giacomini and White (2006) to conduct inference. As a result we test for rationality using χ2
rather than F statistics
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leads to conclusions very similar to those shown in columns (3) and (4) with rationality firmly rejected.
Thus we can be comfortable that our conclusions about rationality are not an artifact of the model
specified.
The results of the χ2 test for rationality (χ2 in table 14) indicate that the null hypothesis of the
rationality of price and wage growth expectations is firmly rejected. Expectations show excess volatility,
so that firms which have high values for expected growth of wages or prices tend to find out-turns
below their expectations. The coefficients on expected price and wage changes are robust to the three
specifications.
When macroeconomic shocks are measured only by Monetary Policy Committee forecast errors, we
find that the error in the growth forecast has a significant influence on price growth errors while wage
growth errors are not materially influenced by either macroeconomic forecast error. When we control
for firm-specific variables known at the time the forecasts were produced, we find that past price and
wage increases also contribute significantly to explaining forecast errors of prices and wages respectively.
We also investigated whether industry price growth (measured by the increase in the producer price
index at a 2-digit level had a material influence on price forecast errors. The coefficients on price index
growth were highly insignificant.
Overall these results cast doubt on whether the strong assumptions in many macro models hold in
reality. They may point to information frictions as discussed in e.g. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015),
but should in any case leave us uncomfortable with the widespread assumption that expectations are
rational.
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Table 14: Forecast Errors: Tests for Rationality
No Time Dummies Time Dummies Time Dummies: BMA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ê (Prices) ê (Wages) ê (Prices) ê (Wages) ê (Prices) ê (Wages)
Price Growth Expectations (lag 4) -0.697∗∗ -0.033 -0.707∗∗ -0.035 -0.699∗∗ -0.001
(-11.33) (-1.70) (-11.82) (-1.80) (-17.77) (-0.19)
Wage Growth Expectations (lag 4) 0.099 -0.675∗∗ 0.118 -0.673∗∗ 0.034 -0.674∗∗
(1.28) (-12.23) (1.48) (-12.32) (0.46) (-19.20)
IR Inflation Forecast Error 0.575∗∗ -0.037
(2.71) (-0.38)
IR Growth Forecast Error 0.405∗∗ -0.119
(2.79) (-1.47)
Expected cost rise (lag 4) 0.279 0.045 0.082 -0.001 0.002 -0.001
(1.50) (0.48) (0.44) (-0.01) (0.07) (-0.04)
Rate of Operation (lag 4) -0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000
(-0.52) (0.44) (-0.20) (0.60) (0.03) (0.08)
Expected employment rise (lag 4) 0.155 0.044 0.097 0.029 0.005 0.001
(0.86) (0.43) (0.51) (0.28) (0.11) (0.08)
Expected orders rise (lag 4) 0.140 0.071 0.144 0.070 0.007 0.002
(0.75) (0.81) (0.77) (0.79) (0.14) (0.12)
Past Price Increase (lag 4) -0.121∗ 0.024 -0.124∗ 0.022 -0.116∗∗ 0.000
(-2.08) (1.48) (-2.14) (1.34) (-3.42) (0.12)
Past Wage Increase (lag 4) 0.122 -0.154∗∗ 0.127 -0.156∗∗ 0.049 -0.150∗∗
(1.56) (-3.55) (1.62) (-3.60) (0.62) (-5.04)
Observations 1836 1829 1836 1829 1836 1829
No. restrictions 8 8 8 8 8 8
χ2 284 300 292 304 532 494
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: CBI and ONS data
Notes: The table reports parameter estimates from estimating the determinants of firms’ forecast errors
controlling for firm fixed effects, with time fixed effects also included in models (3) to (6) (equation (8)).
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Expected Cost Increase Expected Employment Increase
and Expected Orders Increase are dummy variables which take a value one if the respondent expects an
increase and zero otherwise.
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5.2.2 New Orders, Employment and Costs
Next, we consider the rationality of the new orders, employment and cost expectations. The challenge,
as discussed above, is that these are discrete choice variables. Das et al. (1999) set out methods of
testing for rationality when data are categorical. They make the assumption that with three categories
a firm responds “Up” if it forecasts an outcome greater than some value a1, “No change” if the firm
forecasts an outcome in the interval [a2, a1] and “Down” if it forecasts a value below a2. The firm
reports outcomes one quarter later using the same classification method. The cut points, a1 and a2 are
assumed not to change between the forecast and the realisation, although they can differ between firms.
Without observing numerical outcomes (see Lui et al. (2011)) it is not possible to test whether a forecast
of the mean is rational or not. It is possible, however, to test rationality making the assumption that the
forecast is the mode or the median and we follow this approach.26 If the forecast is a median forecast,
the necessary requirement is that the median of the realisation should lie in the same category as the
forecast. Thus, with three categories
3∑
j=k+1
pjk ≤ 0.5 (k = 1, 2)
k−1∑
j=1
pjk ≤ 0.5 (k = 2, 3).
The results of this exercise do not point to any departure from rational behaviour for any of the three
variables we consider: we do not find that more than fifty per cent of the outcomes were for lower ranges
than forecast or for higher ranges than forecast. Details of these tests are also available on request.
But, we can also explore this for respondents conditional on the category of their forecast. The test
results conditional on the initial forecast do point to departures from rationality. For k = 1 or k = 3
we simply need to test whether the proportion pkk ≥ 0.5 is acceptable, contingent on the observed
proportion pˆkk. This is done using the normal distribution with a one-sided test
√
nk
(
pˆkk − 0.5√
pkk(1− pkk
)
∼ N(0, 1).
It is only meaningful to conduct these tests if the observed pˆkk < 0.5. If the observed value is greater
than 0.5 the one-sided test will never reject the hypothesis that the true probability is at least 0.5. If
k = 2, it is not possible for both pˆ12 and pˆ32 to be above 0.5. If neither value is above 0.5 there is, once
again, no point in testing. But if one value is below 0.5, then the normal approximation can again be
used to test whether the difference is significant.
26Results for those based on the mode are available on request.
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In Figure 8a we show the proportions, pkk, of those who (i) reported a fall conditional on having forecast
such an outcome, and those who reported a rise conditional on having forecast such an outcome. When
this proportion drops below 0.5, this is evidence of a departure from rationality. We also show upper
95% confidence interval for each proportion, calculated as
pˆkk + 1.65
√
pkk(1− pkk)
nk
.
Looking first at movements in new orders, Figures 8a and 8b show there are two cases where the
probability of reporting “ Down” conditional on having forecast it is significantly below 0.5. There
are seven cases where the probability of reporting “ Up” conditional on it having been forecast is
significantly below 0.5. With just over twenty observations, we should expect only one of each if firms
are providing rational forecasts of their median outcomes. There is, therefore, some statistical evidence
for over-optimism among firms expecting new orders to rise.
For employment, the evidence for non-rational behaviour is weaker. Figures 8c and 8d show that
there are two occasions when the median test is significantly breached, in both cases by firms which
had forecast falling employment (in 2014Q2 and 2015Q1). There are no breaches by the firms which
forecast stable or rising employment.
On the other hand, forecasts of movements in unit costs clearly fail the tests for rationality. For the
firms that forecast falls in unit costs, the median test was failed significantly on ten occasions. For those
forecasting rises, the median test was also failed on ten occasions (see Figures 8e and 8f). Of these,
there were four occasions (2014Q3, 2015Q2, 2015Q4 and 2016Q1) when the tests were failed both by
the firms which forecast falls in costs and by those which forecast rises. This, of course, might indicate
that firms tended to take views which were too extreme, both on the upside and on the downside.
We noted earlier that the test is based on the premise that firms’ forecasting errors are independent of
each other. If there is a single macro-economic influence that leads to out-turns higher than had been
forecast, for example, then it is not obvious that this is a failure of efficient forecasting. On the other
hand, repeated test failures — of the kind observed for unit cost expectations — may be indicative of
forecasting failure rather than macroeconomic shocks. It is hard to see that a common macroeconomic
shock could, on four occasions out of twenty-three, lead to significantly below half of the firms who
forecast a fall in costs actually experiencing this while, at the same time, significantly fewer than half
of the firms who forecast a rise actually experienced this.
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Figure 8: Rationality tests for new orders, employment and cost expectations
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(b) New orders (Rise)
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(c) Employment (Fall)
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Source: CBI data
Notes: The figures report results of rationality tests for categorical survey variables using the method-
ology described in section 5.2.2
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5.3 Summary
We find clear departures from rationality for wage and price expectations, with firms that report extreme
values for expectations tending to observe less extreme outcomes on average. There is also some evidence
that firms which have reported large price and wage increases in the past tend to find outcomes lower
than their expectations.
The tests for rationality of the qualitative responses are inevitably different in character. But, on the
assumption that firms are reporting medians, we find, once we look separately at the firms forecasting
increases from those reporting decreases, clear departures from rationality for new orders and unit costs.
For employment the evidence is weaker- in only two quarters for firms forecasting a fall in employment
and none for those forecasting an increase.
Expectations of new orders seem more likely to be disappointed on the downside than excessively
pessimistic. The most interesting departures were, however, with costs, where we found that, in four
quarters, departures both from those forecasting falls and those forecasting increases. This makes it
very unlikely that the apparent departures from rationality may have been the outcome of a single
macroeconomic shock.
One interpretation of our results is that firms may have rational expectations of quantity variables —
employment and to some extent new orders — but not of price variables — wages and unit costs. That
might be the case if, at least in the short term, quantity variables are much more important to firms
than price variables.27 Of course, all these factors are still related. For example, employment decisions
also affect unit costs. But, while employment expectations appear more rational, there may still be
departures from rationality for unit costs: firms may not assess rationally the prospects for the other
influences on costs.
6 Conclusions
Modern macroeconomic models make a number of assumptions about the common information, forward-
looking behaviour and rationality of firms. These assumptions play an important role in determining
the predictions of these models for aggregate outcomes. Insights for these models have also influenced
central banking where the management of inflation expectations is considered to be important in order
to achieve low and stable inflation rates (Bernanke (2004)).
27These findings are also consistent with the results for New Zealand in Coibion et al. (2018) who find that many more
firms track GDP compared to inflation.
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We shed new light on how firms’ expectations are formed, and whether they matter, using a novel
panel dataset on manufacturing firms’ expectations from the UK’s Confederation of British Industry.
We focused our analysis around three issues: (i) the information on which firms’ form expectations
and the associated heterogeneity and dispersion this might produce (ii) whether firms’ are forward-
looking in their price setting and whether expectations affect pricing outcomes today (iii) whether
firms’ expectations are rational. All three of these components are central to modern macro models.
We have shown that firms’ expectations of price and wage growth are influenced by a combination of
aggregate and firm level indicators; price expectations seem mainly related to firm level indicators but
with modest influence from past import price growth, while wage expectations are materially influenced
by expected GDP growth and past CPI inflation as well as firm-specific effects. Expected growth in
new orders and employment are most closely associated with past orders, while cost expectations seem
to reflect past firm specific costs and aggregate import price inflation. Given the small amount of
previous work on this issue, the precise regression specification we used to arrive at these results is
clearly subject to a considerable degree of uncertainty. It is therefore reassuring that the application of
Bayesian model averaging to our data, with the aim of uncovering the expectations formation function
in an agnostic and systematic way, yields clear results. Overall, this suggests that firm-specific influences
play an important role, and that firms are selective about the indicators that they use when forming
expectations for particular variables. As in other recent papers, we also find evidence of considerable
dispersion of firms’ price and wage growth expectations.
Firms’ wage and price growth expectations also seem to matter for price setting behaviour. We test the
notion that firms’ own pricing decisions are influenced by their expectations of what their price might
be in the future. To our knowledge, we are the first to examine this relationship at the firm level and,
although we do not estimate a structural relationship, our approach can be easily motivated by theories
often used to derive aggregate Phillips Curves in the macro literature. We find a clear positive, and
significant, effect of expectations on both current wage and price decisions. This is robust to a range
of specifications. We use Bayesian model averaging to show that our results are robust to all 131,072
possible regression models. Although this is evidence that firms’ expectations are important in pricing
decisions, we also show that these expectations are not fully rational. Expectations channels (e.g. in
the transmission of monetary policy) therefore still seem potentially important, but actual outcomes
will depend on how precisely expectations are formed. The statistical evidence in section 3 speaks to
this, but understanding the expectations formation process more deeply is an interesting avenue for
future work.
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Taken together, our results suggest heterogeneity in the use of information, rational inattention or
bounded rationality and some degree of forward-looking behaviour may be important empirical regular-
ities in firms’ expectations of future outcomes. This suggests that the transmission mechanisms may be
more complex than many models typically assume. Whether this changes the predictions of our models
is then, ultimately, a theoretical issue, but our results provide new and important empirical insights to
motivate this line of work.
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Table 15: Definition of survey variables
Variable name Variable description
Expected price growth (C) Expected increase in price of own output over the
next year
Expected wage growth (C) Expected increase in own wage rates over the next
year
Expected unit cost growth (Q) Are unit costs expected to rise, not change or fall
over the next three months?
Expected employment growth (Q) Is employment expected to rise, not change or fall
over the next three months?
Expected new orders growth (Q) Is the volume of new orders expected to rise, not
change or fall over the next three months?
Past price growth (C) Increase in price of own output over the past year
Past wage growth (C) Increase in own wage rates over the past year
Past unit cost growth (Q) Did unit costs rise, not change or fall over the last
three months?
Past new orders growth (Q) Did volume of new orders rise, not change or fall over
the last three months?
Past employment growth (Q) Did employment rise, not change or fall over the last
three months?
Rate of operation (C) Current rate of operation (%)
Notes: C indicates cardinal variable and Q indicates qualitative variable.
Zellner, A. (1986). On Assessing Prior Distributions and Bayesian Regression Analysis with the g-prior
Distribution. In P. Goel and A. Zellner (Eds.), Bayesian Inference and Decision Techniques: Essays
in Honour of Bruno de Finetti, pp. 233–243. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
A Variable definitions
Tables 15 and 16 describe the variables used.
B Reweighting
Table 5 shows that the sectoral composition of the CBI survey sample is rather different from that
of the manufacturing sector as a whole. Composition effects may, unless corrected, therefore result in
survey aggregates which differ from the corresponding aggregate data. In this appendix we describe the
re-weighting we have used to correct for this. The first point to note is that the most natural means
of weighting would be with reference to value added. That is, however, not possible because the CBI
survey does not record the value added of each of its respondents. Instead we are forced to reweight
with reference to employment and employment categories. The ONS’ Business Structure Database
(BSD) allows us to identify enterprises by employment in each enterprise. We classify the firms in the
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Table 16: Definition of macroeconomic and industry-level variables
Variable name Variable description ONS Code
2-digit price growth Growth over four quarters in the Output Price Index
of the 2-digit SIC to which the firm belongs
Various. See note
below.
IR inflation forecast Rate of inflation over next four quarters forecast by
MPC of the Bank of England
IR GDP growth forecast Rate of GDP growth over next four quarters forecast
by MPC of the Bank of England
CPI inflation Rate of CPI inflation over past four quarters D7BT
AWE growth Rate of growth of average weekly earnings over past
four quarters
KAB9
Unemployment rate Unemployment rate (%) MGSX
Import price growth Rate of growth of import price deflator over past four
quarters
(IKBI-
BOKH+BQHQ)/
(IKBL-
BQKO+BQHS)
Notes: Variables are expressed in % p.a. unless stated otherwise.
For 2-digit price codes see table 4 of the data set available at
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/datasets/producerpriceindexreferencetables.
The import price index is the deflator for goods and services adjusted for MTIC fraud
economy by employment category as shown in table 4 and SIC 2-digit grouping as shown in table 5.
From the BSD we can then work out the share of total manufacturing employment in each employment
category/SIC category cell. We use the average values for the period 2008-2016. We can similarly count
the number of firms in the CBI sample in each employment category/SIC category cell. A weight for
each cell is calculated as the share of employment divided by the number of firms in the cell, again for
the whole of the sample period. This means that cells with a relatively high employment share are
given high weights and cells with a relatively high number of firms are given low weights. There are
four cells with no firms observed in the survey despite some employment being shown in the BSD. We
have to give these zero weights, but add employment share to the nearest cell which does show both
employment and survey respondents, thereby increasing the weight given to these nearest neighbours.
C A micro-founded firm-level pricing relationship
In this section we illustrate one way to motivate a firm-level pricing relationship consistent with our
data and similar to equation 4 in the text. As noted in the text, our goal is not to estimate a particular
structural model, but this appendix provides some theoretical motivation for the firm-level analysis in
the main text.
We start from the Rotemberg (1982) price setting model and introduce nominal rigidities using price
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adjustment costs as in Rotemberg (1982).28
Specifically, we consider the following problem faced by a firm that maximises its expected profits in
the presence of price adjustment costs,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
pft yf − PtΨft − γ2
(
pft
pft−1
− 1
)2
Ptyt
]/Pt (9)
and subject to a demand function that follows the Dixit Stiglitz model of imperfect competition,
yft (d) =
(
pft
Pt
)−θ
yt, (10)
where ψft =∂Ψ
f
t /∂y
f
t , is the the marginal cost of production, p
f
t is the price firm f charges for its output,
and yft is the quantity produced. Pt is the price of consumption goods and yt is aggregate output. Ψ
f
t
is the cost of production measured in terms of consumption goods, so that PtΨ
f
t is the nominal cost of
production.
The first order condition is
0 = yft (1− θ) + ψft θyft p˜ft − γ
[
Πft − 1
]
p˜ft|t−1yt + βEt
(
λt+1
λt
γ
[
Πft+1 − 1
]
Πft+1p˜
f
t+1|tyt+1
)
(11)
where p˜ft ≡ Ptpft , p˜
f
t|t−1 ≡ Ptpft−1 and Π
f
t =
pft
pft−1
.
To arrive at a linear pricing relationship in terms of firm-level price growth, we linearise the first order
condition above. Typically with Calvo pricing-based approaches a symmetric equilibrium would need to
be imposed and the linearised pricing relationship would produce the aggregate New Keynesian Phillips
Curve. A key advantage of following the approach above is that we end up with a firm level relationship
that motives the empirical approach in the text.
For ease of derivation re-define any inflation term as the gross inflation rate, p˜i= 1 + pi above. Also,
divide through by yft
0 = yft (1− θ) + ψft θyft p˜ft − γ
[
Πft − 1
]
p˜ft|t−1yt + βEt
(
λt+1
λt
γ
[
Πft+1 − 1
]
Πft+1p˜
f
t+1|tyt+1
)
θ
(
1− ψft p˜ft
)
= 1− γ
[
Πft − 1
] p˜ft|t−1yt
yft
+ βγEt
(
λt+1
λtΠt+1
[
Πft+1 − 1
]
Πft+1
yt+1
yft
p˜ft+1|t
)
28The New Keynesian Phillips Curve is often derived using Calvo pricing. Rotemberg pricing produces a pricing
relationship relationship at the firm level that would not be possible under Calvo pricing, which assumes some firms
do not change prices each period. After aggregation, Rotemberg pricing is identical to Calvo pricing to first order (see
Roberts (1995) for a discussion).
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Taking the left-hand side first:
− θψ˜ft (12)
where ψ˜ft = ψˆ
f
t + pˆt − pˆft are firm-specific real marginal costs and p˜ft = pft /Pt . It is assumed that the
steady-state inflation rate is of size similar to the linearised deviations of the other variables, so that
the product of it and any other variables is second-order and can be neglected. In the steady state all
inflation rates are assumed equal so that
[
Πft − 1
]
= 0. This means that we need consider only the
linearisation of this term; the deviations of the other terms in the product are multiplied by zero. The
first term on the right-hand side simplifies to:
− γ(pˆift ) (13)
which when linearised (and imposing pi = 1 and symmetry in the steady state becomes, with ˆindicating
deviations, and with the deviations of both gross and net price changes equal to pˆift : Expanding and
linearising the second term on the right-hand side gives
γβ
(
pˆift+1
)
(14)
Putting all this together yields a firm-level pricing relationship where individual price changes today
are related to future expected own-price changes.
pˆift = βEtpˆi
f
t+1 +
θψ
γ
ψ˜ft (15)
where ψ˜ft denotes firm-specific real marginal costs (nominal marginal cost relative to their firm’s own
price). Imposing symmetry would convert this into an aggregate relationship, as in Roberts (1995) (the
New Keynesian Phillips Curve).
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